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Microprocessor-Based Integrated LMFBR Core surveillance (Part II) 
Abstract: 
This report is the result of the KfK part of a joint study of KfK and 
INTERATOM. The aim of this study is to explore the advantag~s of micro-
processors and microelectronics for a more sophisticated core 
surveillance, which is based on the integration of separate surveillance 
techniques. 
After a description of the experimental results gained with the different 
surveillance techniques so far, it is shown which kinds of correlation can 
be done using the evaluation results obtained from the single surveillance 
systems. 
The main part of this report contains the systems analysis of a 
microcomputer-based system integrating the different surveillance methods. 
After an analysis of the hardware requirements a hardware structure for 
the integrated system is proposed. The software structure is then 
described for the subsystems performing the different surveillance 
algorithms as well as for the system which does the correlation thus 
deriving additional information from the single results. 







beschreibt den KfK-Teil einer gemeinsamen Studie von KfK 
Ziel dieser Studie ist es, den Vorteil der Mikroprozessor-
eine fortgeschrittene Kernüberwachung aufzuzeigen, die auf 
verschiedener Überwachungstechniken basiert. 
Nach einer Beschreibung der bisher erlangten Ergebnisse mit den unter-
schiedlichen Überwachungsmethoden wird aufgezeigt, wie die Verarbeitungs-
ergebnisse der einzelnen Verfahren miteinander korreliert werden können. 
Der Hauptteil dieses Berichts enthält eine Systemanalyse für ein auf 
Mikrorechnern basierendes System, das die verschiedenen Überwachungs-
methoden integriert. Nach einer Analyse der Hardware-Anforderungen wird 
eine Struktur für das integrierte System vorgeschlagen. Danach erfolgt 
eine Beschreibung der Software-Struktur sowohl für die einzelnen 
Überwachungs-Subsysteme als auch für das System, das durch Korrelation der 
Einzelergebnisse zusätzliche Information gewinnt. 
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I. Preface 
In future fast breeder design the concept of preventive actions will 
be attached particular irnportance; besides the concepts 
operational and adrninstrative rneasures, 
dernonstration of inherent safety features of the core and 
subassernblies, 
scrarn by a DND systern in case of rapid progression of darnage, 
priority is attributed to the early recognition of defects. 
The goal consists in identifying anomalaus conditions of operation in 
the early phase of their developrnent before the normal surveillance 
instrurnentation responds of lirnit values are attained, respectively. 
In general, a subsequent darnage analysis reveals that already in the 
early phase of appearence of the anornaly rninor indications can be 
found in the rneasured values which, however, are initially not noticed 
because of their insignificance. 
In Part I of this study /GME 84/ various rneasuring techniques 
were presented which had been applied both to out-of-pile rigs and to 
the KNK reactor. The interrelationship existing between the initially 
largely independent individual techniques was described by fault 
propagation diagram (cf. Fig. 1.1). This diagram describes the 
phenornenological sequence of rneasurernent which can becorne effective in 
each particular case. 
Besides - based an the individual techniques - a coarse concept was 
elaborated for a rnicroprocessor-based integrated surveillance systern 
( c f . F ig . 1. 2) . 
This report describes part II of the joint KfK and INTERATOM-study. 
The study is subdivided in 2 rnain parts: 
The KfK-part is concerned with a detailed systern analysis as well 
as the developrnent of correlation algorithrns. 
The systern analysis as one subpart will clarify the detailed 
requirernents for the proposed rnicrocornputer systern with respect to 
cornputation speed, capacity, redundancy, diversity, reliability, 
and the use of busses as a cornrnunication medium. 
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As an other essential subpart 
developed starting from the 
the correlation algorithms are 
cause consequence diagram for 
disturbances (Fig. 1.1). Based on this diagram, appropriate 
algorithms aimed at combining the results of separate core 
surveillance techniques are suggested. By means of correlation of 
results additional information can be derived which is useful for a 
more sensitive and an earlier failure detection. 
The INTERATOM-part introduces the concept of an LMFBR diagnostic 
system based on artificial intelligence techniques. 
As a subpart the construction of a knowledge base is demonstrated 
by means of a real life example, the sodium-level-control-system. 
The other subpart deals with the manipulation and utilization of 
knowledge, which is imprecise, uncertain, or probabilistic in 
nature. The handling of such 'fuzzy' sets is as well visualized by 
means of the sodium-level-control-system example. 
The common topic of these two approaches is the usage of modern 
software techniques, especially artificial intelligence. 
The INTERATOM-approach favours a complete expert system for LMFBR 
diagnostics, whereas the KfK-approach is a mixture of conventional 
techniques (microprocessor-based individual process control system) 
and pattern recognition based problern solving. In the KfK-part the 
application of pattern recognition techniques - a subdiscipline of 
artificial intelligence - mainly concentrated on the software within 
the decision making level (cf. Fig. 1.2) and in the acoustic noise 
subsystem. 
/GME 84/ Gmeiner, 1. (Editor): Microprocessor-Based Integrated LHFBR 




Part I of this study was concerned with existing separate core 
surveillance techniques. Starting from the analysis of these 
techniques, a rough concept (cp. Preface, Fig. 1.1) for an integrated 
microprocessor-based core surveillance system was given. 
The central point of this concept was the so-called 
decision-making-level (DML). The newly introduced DML is interfaced to 
all units in the separate-evaluation-level (SEL). The elements of the 
SEL are the separate individual core surveillance techniques. 
Chapter 2 summarizes shortly the results of and the experiences with 
the currently existing separate systems. 
Unfortunately, the current form of processing and the outputs arenot 
always appropriate for usage tagether with the proposed DML. As a 
consequence, some modifications are necessary in the separate systems. 
This modification mainly concentrates on the identification and 
isolation of common subparts in the data acquisition area. The system 
analysis showed that primarily the acquisition of fuel element outlet 
temperatures is a promising candidate for common preprocessing. 
Furthermore, some modifications were necessary to define a unique 
interface to the DML. The results of these modifications are described 
in more detail in chapters 4.1 and 4.2 
Chapter 3 is concerned with the refinement of the DML. For that reason 
it introduces a correlation method, which combines and correlates the 
outputs of each individual system. Based on some realistic examples 
the methodology is explained and the rough data structure for an 
information flow between SEL and DML are considered. 
Chapter 4 describes the systems analysis for the total, integrated 
system. As mentioned before, the modules appropriate for common 
preprocessing are identified. This preprocessing and other aspects are 
the basis for a refinement of the system concept (cp. Fig. 1.2). 
Furthermore, the hardware and software requirements for the complete 
system are investigated. The main effort hereby concentrates on the 
software aspect (cp. chapterlt-.4.). 
Chapter 5 describes an implementation plan for a stepwise realization 
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of this concept starting from existing subsystems. 
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2. Experimental Verification of Direct and Indirect Measurements 
2.1 Experience with subassembly state and performancemonitaring 
M. Edelmann, KfK-INR 
In fast breeder reactors individual subassembly (SA) state and performance 
monitaring is of particular interest because single SA faults might have 
severe safety implications and could possibly lead to major whole-core 
incidents. A well-known initiating anomaly of this kind is local loss of 
cooling within a SA. In general, this cannot be detected by conventional SA 
outlet temperature monitaring even if it causes fuel failure due to over-
heating. Special methods of sensitive (indirect) SA coolant flow monitaring 
have been developed and tested, therefore. The experimental SA monitaring 
system KASUMOS I Edelmann 82 I was built for this and other purposes. First 
experience with this system obtained at the sodium cooled test reactor KNK II 
/Edelmann 83/ was encouraging KASUMOS performance tests under the more rea-
listic breeder reactor conditions of the french breeder prototype Phenix. 
Experience obtained at this reactor is described elsewhere in some detail 
/Edelmann 84/. 
The principle of KASUMOS SA state and performance monitaring is illustrated 
by the blockdiagram in Fig. 2.1-1. Three major functions can be distin-
guished: 
1 - Measurement and identification of thermal-hydraulics fuel element 
(SA model) parameters (parameter estimator). 
2 - On-line prediction of dynamic SA outlet temperature reference signals 
(fuel element +TC simulator). 
3 - Sensitive SA coolant flow monitaring by intercomparison of measured 
and model-predicted outlet temperatures; monitaring of parameter 
estimator outputs with respect to variations in SA state (fuel-to-
coolant heat transfer coefficient, SA power, fuel temperature coolant 
mass flow; TC response time). 
Conclusions from investigations at KNK II and Phenix can be summarized as 
follows: 
1 - The sensitivity of SA outlet temperature monitaring with respect 
to local loss of cooling is significantly improved by balancing-
out those temperature fluctuations which are caused by operational 
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and stochastic variations of reactor power, primary coolant flow 
and inlet temperature. This is achieved by subtracting the model-
predicted outlet temperatures from the actually measured ones 
(= 11 balanced outlet temperatures 11 ). An example of this procedure 
is given in Fig. 2.1-2. There it is seen that during apower varia-
tion of more than 13% of nominal power the coolant outlet temperature 
of a SA changes by about 23K whereas the balanced outlet temperature 
varies by less than 1K. As a consequence, cooling disturbances of 
1% in SA coolant flow become detectable by balanced outlet tempera-
ture monitoring. It is expected, that fuel failure due to local 
overheating can be excluded in this way. 
2 - In general it is difficult to measure all of the thermal-hydraulic 
SA parameters with good precision. It might be that inherent power 
Variations (power noise, power control) are insufficient and ad 
hoc perturbations are necessary for this purpose. However, it 
turned out that in this case simplified SA models can be used 
for outlet temperature prediction and that the corresponding re-
duced model parameters can be always determined from inherent 
power and outlet temperature fluctions. Thus, sensitive SA coolant 
flow monitaring would still be feasible whereas the precise mea-
surement of thermal-hydraulic fuel parameters and TC time con-
stants might require special power perturbations (power ramps 
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2.2 Experience with individual fuel element temperature monitoring 
U. Voges, KfK/IDT 
A microprocessor based system is installed at the KNK II which 
monitors the individual fuel element coolant outlet temperatures. This 
system is in on-line open loop operation since summer 1983. The 
experience gained during the operatio can be summarised as follows: 
1. Interface 
Some problems and failures occured with the installed separating amplifiers 
and the analog/digital-converters. The errors were mainly detected by 
Software implemented plausibility checks. 
2. Microprocessors 
After preliminary testing there occured no failure in 
the microprocessor system. The system behaviour was 
quite stable. From the about 100 boards one I/0 board 
failed, from the about 15 power supplies two failed 
during one year operation. 
3. Fuel elements 
Concerning cooling disturbances the reactor operation 
was normal. Therefore no detection could be made and 
no experience gained. 
4. Algorithms 
The implemented algorithms showed to be sensible against 
wrong parameters. If position dependent correction 
-i2-
factors differed from the intended ones even less then 10%, 
the detection algorithms would run into alarm situations. 
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2.3 Experiments with temperature noise measurements 
1. Krebs, G. Weinkötz 
The objective of measuring and analysing temperature fluctuations in the 
coolant of LMFBR's is the detection of cooling disturbances within reactor 
subassemblies and the development and performance validation of sensitive 
sensors and measuring devices. Extended experimental and theoretical investi-
gations have been performed for this purpose. The activities in temperature 
noise include three main parts: 
- out-of-pile experiments on unblocked and blocked electrically heated rod 
bundles (ECN 28-rod bundle, KNS 169-rod bundle, TENOFA 61-rod bundle). 
- basic research and model development of the mean and fluctuating velocity 
and temperature field downstream of a simulated reactor subassembly. 
- in-pile performance tests and investigation of long term reliability of 
temperature noise instrumentation at KNK Il and at SNR 300. 
The out-of-pile experiments performed on the electrically· heated rod bundles 
have demonstrated that the analysis of temperature fluctuations is a sensi-
tive method to · detect flow blockages. The blockages can be detected by 
measurements of temperature fluctuations at the outlet of the rod bundle as 
well as downstream of a flow mixer. 
From these investigations the influence of heat flux coolant velocity and 
temperature rise between the inlet and the outlet of the rod bundle on the 
RMS-value and the PSD of temperature fluctuations was deduced. 
In addition to the out-of-pile experiments ~ith flow blockages, measurements 
of the temperature fluctuations have been performed on an unblocked 28-rod 
bundle. It was one aim of these investigations to give a comparison between 
the measured RMS-values of the unblocked 28-rod bundle and the RMS-values 
obtained by measurements with real and simulated blockages. The simulation of 
the blockage was performed by an increase of the rod power of those heater 
rods which are located in the formerly blocked cross section. 
-14-
Same results of the out-of-pile experiments with the 28-rod bundle will be 





I Evaluated for Different Lateral Thermocouple Positions 
Simulated and 
Real Blockage 
Simulated Btockage --- 20°/o 
0 +-------~------~~------~--------~----~ 
0 20 40 60 80 100 
Coolant Channel Bloc:kage [ 0/o J 
RMS-V~lue of Temperature Fluctuations ~n Dependence on the Blockage Size. 
The cross-section of the bundle is shown on the right-hand side of the fi-
gure. Real blockage experiments have been performed with partially blocked 
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coolant sections of 34 % and 68 %. Additionally simulated blockage experi-
ments with 12 % 20 % 34 % and 68 % have been excecuted. The same opera-
tion conditions have been applied to all 28-rod bundle experiments. The tem-
perature fluctuations were measured at the bundle outlet downstream of a flow 
mixer. Calculating the RMS-value the temperature fluctuation signals were 
low-pass filtered by 5 Hz and the integration time was fixed at 30 sec. 
The diagramme shows the averaged RMS-values evaluated for different lateral 
thermocouple positions and their associated tolerance field depending on the 
blockage sizes. Within the demonstrated tolerance field there is no differen-
ce between the RHS-values of simulated and real blockages. The RMS-value is 
about 4 to 5 ~V in the case of the rod bundle without blockage. This is the 
background noise under the operation conditions and the adjusted parameters 
of RMS-value calculation. The RHS-value of a coolant channel blockage of 34 % 
is more than 4 times higher than that of the unblocked bundle. Therefore, it 
can be concluded from the experiments with the 28-rod bundle that a coolant 
channel blockage of 20 % and more will be detected reliable. The indication 
of smaller blockages depends on the temperature noise level of the back-
ground. 
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2.4. Experience with Acoustic Noise Measurements 
H. Rohrbacher, KfK/IRE 
From sodium boiling experiments performed in out-of-pile facilities 
(KNS, NSK) and from the Boiling-Generator Experiment in KNK II it 
appeared that acoustic boiling signals are detected in a broad 
frequency bandwidth still including energy fractions above 100 kHz. 
From all experiments on local boiling using a suitable acoustic 
instrumentation comparable results have been obtained. There are found 
at least two or more increases of autocorrelated power densities in a 
restricted number of frequency-windows. The signal density 1 s 
distribution depends on the individual acoustic transfer function of 
each test rig as the transmission path acts as a multipolar filter with 
resonances and frequency-dependent attenuations. 
Typical domains are found in a low frequency interval from 5 to 20 kHz 
followed by a high frequency window in most cases reaching from 50 to 
80 kHz and even higher. 
As a consequence of the always present interfering background noise 
from many and mostly unknown acoustic sources and from predominating 
electrical disturbances (mains, controlled semiconductors etc.) the 
measured high frequency signals are due to a significant importance. 
They are found in the micro-volt range and therefore, a high 
signal-to-noise ratio is only realistic for frequencies far above 5 
kHz. In practice, the acoustic signals are preconditioned by use of 
front-end high-pass filters with individually selected 
cutoff-frequencies from 5 to 40 kHz. 
During the experiment all acoustic data are enregistered on analog 
multi-channel tape recorders. For redundancy purposes a certain number 
of signals is stored simualtaneously in the FM and AM mode under 
different conditions with regard to the system 1 s finite bandwidth and 
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dynamic capabilities. 
For boiling experiments an acoustic sensor system is used which 
consists of at least six to twenty individual microphones distributed 
in the detection area directly immersed in the coolant or, to some 
extent they are structure borne to take advantage of the waveguide 
effect. 
The experience with acustic noise measurements turns out that the onset 
of boiling is detectable already at its very early beginning. Under 
normal conditions a maximum dead time of a few milliseconds has proven 
to be typical. Morover, from the boiling signal 1 s repetition rate and 
time function it can be derived the boiling form, i.e. local boiling 
with rapidly collapsing small vapor bubbles or voiding of a large area 
in a subchannel and other known voiding and recondensating phenomena 
during the boiling phase. 
In CABRI reactor the precise time of pin failures were measured by use 
of several microphones detecting the rupture pressure pulse and the 
relevant travelling time of the pulse shock-front to each of them. 
It was 
sensors 
shown from a great 
now being available 
number of experiments that the acoustic 
meet the requirements for a reactor 
application under severe temperature and radiation conditions so far. 
The predominating task to be solved is a further improvement of the 
data evaluation with respect to the background noise associated by 
introduction of an intelligent pattern recognition technique for a 









KfK - IRE 
The latest surnrnary on fission product signals and relevant 
experience in detection, location and characterization of 
failed fuel elernents, prepared on an international level, 
are the Proceedings in [1]. According to that docurnentation, 
experience accurnulated with the delayed neutron (DN) technique 
and cover gas rnonitoring have in general been good although 
sorne details are still open. On the other hand, the positive 
experience gathered has given rise to new problerns to be 
treated, for exarnple continued plant operation with failed 
fuel elernents. As a contribution dealing with these unsettled 
problerns, relevant KfK work carried out at KNK II frorn 1981 
until 1984 will be surnrnarized and discussed below. 
2.5.2 Problems 
In.alrnost all countries developing breeder reactors long-terrn 
irradiai:ion experirnents wi th failed fuel pins have been per-
formed and are being planned. However, the long-terrn loop 
experirnents perforrned in the past have left open sorne questions 
regarding the transferability of results to real reactor con-
ditions: 
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- The measurement and conditioning of the oxygen concentration 
in sodium loops does not conform to reactor specifications. 
This could influence the uranate-plutonate (= Na 3Mo 4 ) forma-
tion which is a cause of failed fuel pin swelling. 
The time of sodium transit to the location of the DN monitors 
is extremely short under the conditions in an experimental 
loop and different delayed neutron groups dominate. 
The fission product concentration responsible for the sensi-
tivity of failure detection is lower by several orders of 
magnitude in a reactor than in the loops. 
2.5.3 Description of the test equipment in the KNK II experiments 
The fuel was fresh uo 2 with U-235 enrichment of 37 at.%. The 
specification of the fuel and the cladding tubes corresponded to 
that of the KNK II driver zone. 
To obtain a free fuel surface the pins were provided with 1 and 
0.1 rnrn2 boreholes or with 1 rnrn x 5 rnrn slits in the cladding 
tube. 
The pins were mounted in a plug placed on the KNK II peripheral 
posi tion 511 . As the primary sodi um is used .for fuel pin cooling 
the operational fission product measuring equipment could be 
used: the two DN monitors and the cover gas monitoring devices 
such as germanium garnrna spectrometer, precipitators and Na(I) 
scintillators. 
2.5.4 Test prograrnrne 
The first test series including five single-pin tests indicated 
in Table I were performed under normal KNK II operation con-
ditions at different power steps. In this way, the fission rate, 
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the activity concentration in the sodium, and the fission 
product transit time were varied. 
Table I: Test Programme 
Test No. Defect Area Type of Failure Number of 
(mm2) Defect Location Fuel Pellets 
1 1 borehole j at the fuel 
c~ 2 10 two slits column 3 10 two slits 
4 1 borehole J at the upper t2 5 • 1 borehole gas plenum 12 
2.5.5 Main results 
At the beginning of the irradiations in tests nos. 1 to 3 the 
DN signal showed great fluctuations. High count rates were 
obtained in tests nos. 1 and 3. Tests nos. 4 and 5 no measurable 
DN signals. 
The ratio of the effective fuel surface to the geometrical fuel 
surface is often called the fissuring factor k. For the initial 
phase of the irradiation values of k up to 217 were found. 
After stabilization the values ranged between 9 and 69. 
The post-irradiation examination (PIE) consisted in X-ray radio-
graphs, ceramography, miereprobe analysis, and burn-up measure-
ment. Important results from PIE work are that no significant 
displacements of fuel and cladding occurred during irradiation, 
but that some uranate was formed in the defect area. 
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2.5.6 Discussion 
- At the beginning of the irradiation and in case of great 
ratios of fuel inventory to failure size high maximum values 
were measured of the k-factor. After stabilization the values 
of the k-factor are rnore dependent on the geornetrical failure 
size: high values for little failure sizes, low values for 
great failure sizes. These relations are irnportant for the 
evaluation of the DN signal and the characterization of the 
failure. 
Although the pins were irradiated during several weeks, there 
was no propagation of the failures and no noticeable fuel 
loss occurred. This rneans that reactor operation could be 
continued if failures of these types happened. 
- Even with fresh fuel and low o2-concentration in the sodiurn 
sorne uranate was formed; but the arnount would be too srnall 
to cause any harrn to neighbouring pins. 
- The release of the precursors of the DN emitters was con-
trolled by diffusion rnechanisrns. This partly explains the 
wide range of k-factors because the diffusion depends strongly 
on the fuel structure and its change, especially during the 
first days of irradiation. 
- The results of the tests nos. 4 and 5 led to the assurnption 
that by means of gas garnma spectroscopy and DN rneasurernent 
the classification of the type of the failure could be 
improved. 
Surnrnarizing one can state that with fresh fuel and small failures 
reactor Operation can be continued for several weeks without 
consequences on safety and availability. 
-22-
[1] S. Jacobi, editor: Fuel Failure Detection and Location in 
LMFBRs. Proc. of Int. Atornic Energy Agency Specialists' 
Meeting, Karlsruhe, May 11-14, 1981, KfK 3202, June 1982 
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3. Gorrelation of individual results 
K. Schleisiek, KfK/IRE 
3.1 Introduction 
The reliable detection of disturbances in the core of LMFBR's is rendered 
difficult because of the fact that many events cause only small signal 
\ 
changes which have to be discriminated against background and normal signal 
variations. On the other hand advanced detection methods are under develop-
ment as described in Sect. 2 which allow in many cases diverse disturbance 
recognition. Same examples for diverse fault detection are compiled in 
Table 3,1 and Fig. 3.1 to 3.3. Fig. 3.1 shows some signals measured in an 
in pile experiment where a local blockage caused severe fuel pin failures. 
In general this can be detected by five diverse systems (DN, CM, AN, TN 
and FI, see Fig. 1.1). In the experiment the flow rate was not affected 
significantly, see Fig. 3.1. So FI did not recognize the event. Signals 
for CM and TM have not been recorded in the experiment. The remairring s ig-
nals from DN and AN are shown in Fig. 3. 1. The increase of the acoustic 
noise is caused by flow noLse due to fission gas bubbles in the sodium 
whereas DN indicates the presence of DN emitter in the sodium resulting 
from contact between fuel and sodium Ln the defect area. The time delay 
between the start of signal rise of bath syste~ is due to signal transport 
time from the pin failures to the respective sensor positions. These are 
system-specific values which can vary significantly between different loops 
anq plants. 
Fig. 3.2 ~nd 3.3 show examples of diverse detection of argon bubbles cir-
culated wi th the primary sodi um th'rough 'the· core of a small LMFBR. Agairr 
significant time delay can be seen between the different sensors: At first 
the arrival of the gas bubbles is indicated by acoustic signal (vibrations 
of the structures). This is followed by a decrease of the neutron flux 
(and power) when the bubbles are crossing the central core region. Finally, 
the fuel subassembly outlet temperature reacts to the power variations 
after the sodium transport time from the core center to the subassembly 
outlet. The use of such correlations within the decision making level to 
increase the sensitivity and reliability of fault detection is one of the 
main objectives of the development of an integrated core surveillance 
system. This task is in the following addressed as "event analysis". The 
second objective is to use the sequence of identified events and the 
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observed correlations to determine the kind of disturbance developing and 
the plant status reached (disturbance analysis). Forthis purpose cause-
consequence-diagrams or pattern recognition techniques can be used. Thirdly, 
based on the results of the event and disturbance analysis recommendations 
can be communicated to the operator with respect to adequate actions on the 
plant. 
For the realization of such a system knowledge is necessary of the proper-
ties of the detection system to be incorporated and their "normal" behaviour. 
Examples for the required kind of information are: 
The time response of each individual system to the occurrence of faults 
consisting of the transit time from the fault location to the sensor, 
the time lag of the sensor, and the signal.processing time. Some of 
these parameters are load-dependent. 
The behavior of the individual detection system during plant transient. 
The surveillance quality depends on the degree to which reference values 
or classification criteria follow the true status of the plant during 
the transient. Good agreement may be reached by extensive modelling 
effort or by adaption during the initial operation phase. 
Long-term effects like burn up, aging, and drifts of the electronic 
equipment. 
Most of these information are qualitatively known but the pre-determination 
wi th the precision required would be very expensive. Therefore i t seems 
tobe necessary to start the operation of the DML vnth a learning or 
training phase to adapt the system to the specific conditions of a speci-
fic power plant. Possibly this adaption has partially to be repeated from 
time to time in the succeeding operational phase of the system. 
In the following section it is described in more detail how this objectives 
can be realized in the DML and which informations and data are to be 
transmitted from SEL via CCL2 to DML for this purpose. 
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3.2 Data transfer SEL - DML 
In Tab. 3.2 some properties are listed of the individual detection methods 
which are of importance for the common evaluation within the D~~. With 
respect to the "Flux Til ting Procedure" (FT) no information is included 
because this system works autonomously within the SEL: 
In the first line of Tab. 3.2 the spatial relations are g1.ven for the 
individual systems. This information is important for plausibility checks 
and for the localization of a fault. The system response times in the 
second line are needed for signal correlations from the different detec-
tion systems. The signal band width is used to determine the frequency 
range of signal correlations. 
Considering the properties of the individual detection systems (Sect. 2, 
Tab. 3.2) the following requirements can be derived with respect to the 
informations and data tobe transmitted from SEL to DML (see Tab. 3.3): 
a) The deviations of the actually measured values from reference or 
-I 
normal values with a rate of 1 s For the individual systems these 
are: 
AN: Deviations from background in db 
NF: It is assumed that NF is a reactivity comparator. Deviations 
from rated values C=l) in cent. 
TM/FI and TM: Difference between measured and rated temperature 
increase of each subassembly in K. 
TN: RMS values of the temperature fluctuations devided by the 
temperature increase of each subassembly (k factor). 
DN: Effective free fuel surface after substraction of the background 
in cm2 (recoil). 
DM: Cover gas activity after substraction of the background 
(mainly Ar41) in counts per second. 
Beyond this, with larger intervals additional information on the indi-
vidual systewB are transmitted for storage in the DML, for example: 
the element parameters of TM/FI, the activity concentration of specific 
nuclides of CM. The amont of this information is still to be determined. 
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b) The classification of the deviations (described above under a) deter-
mined by the individual systems (only in the case of changes). The 
following classification system is suggested: 
-1 sys tem not available 
0 normal 
+ 1 slight deviations 
+2 increased 
+3 high 
+4 very high 
The class +1 is reserved for the case that an deviation is recognized 
only by the DML system. The criteria of the classes +2 to +4 have to be 
implemented within the SEL. Complementary informations to be transmitted 
are: clock time, localization, criterion etc. 
c) On request by the DML-system or by operator: transmissions of sequences 
of signals as measured (normally of common time basis) from specified 
individual systems for correlation analysis. The data rate corresponds 
-1 -] 
to the systemband width and amounts to 50 s for AN, FN, TN, and 1 s 
for the other systems. 
3.3 Data storage ln the DML 
Two data storage systems are planned for the DML: a short-term and a 
long-term storage. 
a) Short-term store 
This systemstores the deviations from nominal cf. Sect. 3.2.a. The maxi-
mum d.s.ta rate is 1 per channel and second. The storage capacity is 
determined by the detection system with the langest response time, 1.e. 
CM with about 2000 s. Consequently a storage capacity corresponding to 
one hour should be sufficient. 
b) Long-te rm s tore 
This systems stores the following information on the long-term behaviour 
of the plant: 
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The mean, maximum and IDlnlmum values of the deviations with a rate 
of 1 per hour. Additionally the supplementary informations mentioned 
ln Sec t. 3. 2. a. 
The classified deviations including clock time and identification, 
however only in the case of class changes. For,the dimension of 
the store it can be assumed that such changes occur with a frequency 
-3 -4 
of 10 to 10 per class determination. 
Data processing takes place in the central processing unit. All data 
needed for the evaluation are temporarily transmitted into the ~emory 
of this unit as well as the sequences of measurements described in 
Sect. 3.2.c. Furthermore the central processer contains the whole soft-
ware necessary for process control, data analysis and evaluation. 
3.4 Information processing and evaluation ln the DML 
As mentioned above it seems to be necessary to start the operation of the 
DML with a learning and adaption phase. The main tasks during this phase 
are: 
Learn normal signal pattern and correlations during steady state and 
transient operation including reactor trip. 
Check and if necessary adapt the criteria and algorithms for decision 
mak.ing. 
Illl11lement and check recommendations for operator actions under· abnormal 
plant situations. 
During this phase mainly s tandard functions and programs are needed. Some 
of the required capabilities are: 
Plots of the actual values of the individual systems vs. time. 
Plots of the classes of detected events vs. time. 
Automatie stop of the short-term storage about 30 min. after reactor 
scram; plots of selected data for post-scram analysis. 
Calculation and display of higher-level informations like RMS, PSD, 
variance, cross and coherency functions from the actual values. 
These capabili ties are also needed in the succeeding operational phase. 
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During the learning .phase intense interaction with experts is necessary. At 
the end of this phase the system should be able to recognize independently 
(i.e. without the assistance of experts) abnormal plant situations and 
disturbances and give recomrrendations to the operator for appropriate ac-
tions. 
The process of evaluation of data and decision making is executed on two 
levels: the event analysis and the disturbance analysis. 
a) Even t analysis 
The event analysis ~s perforrned on the basis of the information contained 
in the short-term storage. The data base of the DML contains a catalog 
of credible events including the related reactions of the individual 
detection systems. If one of the detection systems identifies a deviation 
from normal behaviour (i.e. a change in the ciassification) then the DML 
starts automatically the search of correlated si~als in the remain-
ing detection systems which have not been recognized within the SEL. 
On the basis of the stored catalog of events it is decided which systems 
have to be checked. In the search procedure the response time of the 
different detection systems must be taken into account. In some cases 
it is possible to take advantage of the spatial relations between differ-
ent sensors and systems. The search and decision process is illustrated 
by the following two examples: 
I. CM indicates an increase of the cover gas acti vi ty and a change of 
class from 0 to 2. It is likely that a pin failure occured with fission 
gas release. The response time of CH is ab out 30 min. The DML ini ti-
ates the search for abnormal signal patterns of the different channels 
of TN. If such variations are found then the subassembly has been 
identified which contains the failed fuel pin. If furthermore no DN 
change is detected the~ the event is definitely a "leaker" in the 
identified subassembly. 
2. TH/FI indicates a small variation of the flmv rate within a subassembly; 
an increase of the DN signal is not detected. TM and TN of the same 
subassembly are checked for anomalies. If only TM indicates a devia-
tion then ar;r external blockage ~s likely of the subassembly concerned. 
If additionally an increase of TN can be found then the fault probably 
~s an inactive internal blockage. 
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The deviations identified by the DML are markedas class 1 events; the 
classification and the result of the event identification is stored for 
the succeeding disturbance analysis. 
b) _Disturbance analysis 
For the automatic disturbance analysis within the DML, two procedures 
are actually under consideration which are described briefly in the 
following section. 
Disturbance analysis by pattern recognition 
Basis of the analysis is the temporal sequence of classified deviations 
determined by the individual systems. The absolute time differences 
are not taken into account because the time scale for the development 
of faults can vary significantly and is difficult tobe predicted. 
The informations are represented as a 3-dimensional vector with the 
parame ters: de tection sys tem, temporal sequence, and classes of 
deviations. For the initial operation phase synthetic vectors are 
formed of all known or credible disturbances and stored in the DML 
system. An example of a synthetic vector is shown in Fig. 3.4. With 
increasing operation experience the artificial vectors will be re-
placed by observed ones. The identification of an actually develop-
ing disturbance is then performed by a pattern recognition process: 
.By comparison of the pattems it is decided which of the stored vectors 
has the largest similarity with the observed one and hence, represents 
with high probability the developing disturbance. 
Disturance analysis by cause-consequence-diagrams 
For all credible disturbances cause-consequence-diagrams are construc-
ted and stored in the DML. The diagrams are composed of events which 
are identical to those used in the event analysis (see Sect. a above). 
The disturbance is identified by comparing the observed sequence and 
combination of events with the stored diagrams. 
Comparing both methods i t seems that the pattern recogni tion technique 
has the higher potential because it is able to make a decission also in 
those cases where none of the stored disturbances is exactly met. This 
is of particular importance because many of the fault propagation pro-
cesses under consideration are - at least to a certain degree - of 
stochastic nature. On the other hand this solution is more expensive with 
regard to progranrrning and computing time. 
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The recommendations to the operators with respect to the actions tobe 
executed in the case of disturbances depend on the degree of darnage 
reached. Actually it ~s planned to attribute such recomrnendations to the 
cause-consequence-diagrams and to edit them together with the result of 
the disturbance analysis. For the future it is envisaged to develop 
I 
more sophisticated criteria which take into account e.g. the temporal 
development of the disturbance and the degree of agreement between the 
actual case and the experience stored in the system. 
event I physical phenomenon r measurab le effect detection system 
pin failure (leaker) 
acti ve b lockage ~n 




fission gas release into 
sodium 
increase of temp. no~se 
at subassembly outlet 
TN 
~-----------------------------~-----------------------------~------------------------------
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TM/FI I TM I TN I DN I CM 
spatial identification 
Q = core 
CS = core Sector I c I c I SA I SA I SA I es I c 
SA = subassembly 
response time ;-s 7 1 1 I 5 I 5 I 5 I 30 I 2000 
signal band width /-Hz 7 105 102 I 10 I 1 I 15 I 3 I 0, I c.:> 
1\) 
Tab. 3.2: Important properties of individual detection systems 
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Fig. 3.2: Diverse detection of gas bubbles by 
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Fig. 3.3: Diverse detection of gas bubbles in the core by 
reactirneter and subassernbly outlet temperature 
signals 
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AN NF TM/FI TN TM DN CM events/comments 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 normal state 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 failure of a 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
high burn 
0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
up 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 fuel pin 
0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
0 0 0 0 0 I 1 
0 0 0 0 0 2 I 
0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 propagation of 
0 0 0 0 0 I 1 
the failureJ 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 
0 0 0 0 0 2 2 blockage formation 
0 0 0 I 0 2 2 
0 0 1 I 1 2 2 
0 0 1 2 1 3 2 
2 0 1 3 1 3 2 local boiling 
1 0 1 2 1 3 2 
and mel ting 1 0 1 2 1 4 2 
1 0 1 2 1 4 3 
I 0 1 2 1 4 4 
Fig. 3.4: Example of a synthetic vector of deviation classes 
("active local blockage") 
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4. Systems Analysis 
V. Elies, KfK/IDT 
4.1. Reguirements Analysis of the RIL 
As a first step in defining the Reading and Input Level RIL (cf. Fig. 1.2.) 
and the Common Communication Level 1 (CCL1) the requirements of the single 
preprocessing units in the RIL are analyzed from the viewpoints of the 
different systems in the Separate Evaluation Level (SEL). Common 
requirements are identified and the preprocessings of the same input 
signals for different SEL-systems are combined where possible. 
The input signal identifiers (i1, ... ) are the same as in Part1ofthis 
study, chapter 3. 
Concerning the numbers of signals tobe processed this analysis is based 
on numbers which are considered for the SNR 2 reactor. 
4.1.1. Acoustic Signals (il) 
The acoustic signals are used only by the Acoustic Noise Detection (AN). 
Due to the high signal bandwidth (100 kHz) part of the preprocessing has 
to be done by specialized hardware. 
The instrumentation for the acoustic signals consists of 10*2 sensors. 
The preprocessing is divided into two parts: 
a.) RMS generation by integration of all acoustic signals and 
subsequent digitalisation. The generated outputtobe transferred 
to the SEL is about 100 Bytes/sec. 
b.) Analog to digital conversion of the signals for subsequent FFT. 
For each channel a sample of 500 values has to be transmitted once 
per second. This yields a total amount of 10 Kßytes/sec. 
Since these data are used only by the AN system and because of the 
required high transfer rate a direct transmission to the AN system 
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without using a common communication medium will be preferred. 
4.1.2. Pump Rotation Speed (i2) 
This signal considered only for the AN system is not taken into account 
any more. Signal i4 (primary flow rate) will be used instead. 
4.1.3. Neutron Flux (i3) 
For processing of the neutron flux another separate evaluation unit NF 
is added to the SEL. 
Scanning frequency for the triple redundant neutron flux signal is 
50 .. 100Hz for NF, 1 Hz for the following systems: AN, TM, ON/CM and 
FT. For all of these systems the preprocessing does consist only of an 
A/0-conversion with a 12-bit-resolution being sufficient. The converted 
digital data can be transmitted to the systems listed above via a common 
communication medium. 
Additionally the neutron flux is used by the TM/FI system, but here it 
is used as a reference signal for analog preprocessing (cf. 4.1.6.), 
thus being needed in analog form. 
4.1.4. Primary Coolant Flow Rate (i4) 
Coolant flow is used by the following systems: AN, TM/FI, ON/CM and FT. 
Two signals, one for each primary loop, are available. Sampling rate is 
5 Hz for TM/FI, 1Hz for the other systems. The only preprocessing 
necessary is A/0-conversion, subsequently the data can be affered to the 
different systems via a common communication medium. 
-40-
4.1.5. Core Inlet Temperatures (i5) 
There is a triple redundant signal for each primary loop. The redundancy 
is needed only by the TM system, the other ones use only one signal per 
loop. 
The preprocessing for TM consists of the following steps: 
- A/0-conversion, 
- plausibility checks, identification of defective thermocouples, 
- mean value computation of the three redundant input channels, 
- conversion to Kelvin 
The mean temperatures evaluated by the preprocessing for TM can be used 
by the following systems as well: AN, ON/CM and FT. The sampling rate 
is 3 Hz for TM, the other systems do only need a rate of 1 Hz. The mean 
temperatures are affered to these systems via a common medium. 
The TM/FI and TN systems need analog signals again for analog 
preprocessing (cf. 4.1.6.). 
4.1.6. Core Outlet Temperatures (i6) 
Core outlet temperatures are available as triple redundant signals for 
each fuel element. 
Preprocessing for TM consists of the same steps as in the case of the 
inlet temperatures. Additionally the coolant temperature rise is 
computed. The mean temperatures can be used again by AN, ON/CM and FT, 
thus transmission via a common medium is possible. 
12-bit resolution attainable by A/0-conversion is not sufficient for 
processing of temperatures within TM/FI and TN systems. Therefore these 
require a special analog preprocessing. The existing preprocessing 
units are shown in fig. 4.1. and 4.2. 
-41-
Because of the special kind of the data resulting from preprocessing 
they are sent directly to the SEL units after A/0-conversion. 
4.1.7. ONO Signal (i7) 
Geli-system Count Rate (i9) 
Pr~_cipitator Count Rate (i10) 
These signals are used only by ON/CM and FT. Preprocessing is performed by 
special hardware, e.g. counting tubes, multi-channel analyzer. The output 
generated by these is transmitted directly to the SEL units. 
4.1.8. Reactor Power (i8) 
Reactor power is measured via neutron flux, thus no separate signal is 
necessary any more. 
4.1.9. Position of Absorber Rods (i11) 
There is one signal for each absorber. They are required only by FT, 
only A/0-conversion is necessary, sampling rate is 1 Hz. 
4.1.10. Conclusions 
After comparing the requirements it can be seen that in most cases the 
preprocessing depends very much on the system which processes the 
generated data. Only for the following signals the preprocessing for 
different SEL systems can be integrated: 
- i 3 neutron flux (NF, AN, TM, ON/CM, FT) 
i4 primary flow rate (AN, TM/FI, ON/CM, FT) 
- ; 5 inlet temperatures (AN, TM, ON/CM, FT) 
- i 6 outlet temperatures (AN, TM, ON/CM, FT) 
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In spite that fact a considerable reduction of hardware expense is 
possible by combining the preprocessings of outlet temperatures because 
of the great number of fuel elements (about 370). 
4.2. Concept of CCL1 
Table 4.1. gives an overview of the amounts of data produced by the 
single preprocessing units and required by the different units in the 
SEL. As can be seen we can divide the data to be transferred by CCL1 
into five groups: 
A. Data used only by AN 
These are the outputs of the two different preprocessings of i1: 
- RMS values, 100 Bytes/s 
- Digital form of i1, 10 KBytes/s 
Transmission of data to AN can be done via a bus commonly used by 
both preprocessing units (Bus A). 
B. Data with special preprocessing for TM/FI 
The output generated by the preprocessing unit consists of 2 Bytes 
per fuel element, scanning frequency is 5 Hz, thus an amount of 
about 4 Kbyte/s has tobe transmitted to TM/FI. 
C. Data with special preprocessing for TN 
Output of the analog preprocessing with subsequent A/D-conversion 
consists of the following parts: 
- o1(t) temperature fluctuation, 11100 Bytes/s 
-LHi coolant temperature rise, 1480 Bytes/s 
- 6'; RMS va 1 ues of Si , 1480 Bytes/ s 
This makes a total amount of 14KBytes/s, thus requiring a fast 
direct link to TN for data transmission. 
D. Data with common preprocessing for different SEL units 
These data contain preprocessed inputs i3, i4, i5, i6: 
- neutron flux, max. 200 Bytes/s 
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- primary flow rate, 10 Bytes/s 
- mean inlet temperatures, 15 Bytes/s 
- mean outlet temperatures, 2300 Bytes/s 
- temperature rise, 2300 Bytes/s 
The sum of 5 KBytes/s can be distributed to the single units in SEL 
via a common bus system (Bus 0). 
E. Data only used by DN/CM and FT 
No information is available yet on the output of preprocessing of 
i7, i9 and i10. Probably a common transmission to DN/CM and FT 
tagether with the digital form of i11 will be possible (Bus E). 
A resulting structure of RIL and CCL1 is shown in fig. 4.3. For 
reliability and availability reasons all the single communication 
subsystems within CCL1 have to be redundant. 
Redundant bus systems are available within process control systems such 
like Siemens TELEPERM M or BBC 1 s PROCONTROL. One approach in realizing 
RIL and CCL1 could be the use of such a system. The TELEPERM M bus 
offers a transfer rate of 250 KBit/s, which is sufficient for all the 
single bus subsystems mentioned above. One disadvantage of TELEPERM M 
is nonavailability of fiber optic links, a desirable feature for making 
data transfer more safe. 
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4.3. Concept of CCL2 and DML 
4.3.1. Requirements for CCL2 
The following data amounts have tobe transferred from SEL to DML via 
CCL2 (cf. 3.2., Tab. 3.3.): 
a.) Deviations of actually measured values (for each value two bytes are 
assumed to be necessary): 
AN 40 Bytes/s 
NF 2 Bytes/s 
TM/FI 740 Bytes/s 
TM 740 Bytes/s 
TN 740 Bytes/s 
ON 2 Bytes/s 
CM 2 Bytes/s 
In addition to these 2.3 KBytes/sec approximately there will be more 
information being transmitted which is not yet defined. Nevertheless 
a total amount of 5 Kbytes/sec can be estimated as an upper bound. 
b.) Classification of the deviations in case of changes: 
A status change is assumed to occur with a frequency of 10.3 to 10·~ 
per class determination (cf. 3.3), which is done in time intervals of 
1 s. Thus a change is tobe expected approximately once every hour. 
A transmission of the complete new state vector after a change having 
occurred results in a data amount of about 1.2 KBytes/h. 
c.) Transmissions of sequences of signals as measured: 
The amount of data being transmitted on request can be estimated as 
the overall data amount produced by the RIL. The data listed in 4.2., 
A to 0, result in 33 KBytes/s. Tagether with the data transferred by 
Bus E a total amount of about 40 KBytes/s has to be expected. 
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The data which have to be transferred via CCL2 amount to about 
50 KBytes/s. Possibly the single SEL systems are spatially distributed. 
Therefore a local area network should be provided for CCL2, thus also 
allowing to pass some of the transmitted data to OGL, if required. 
Because of the required realtime behaviour a token passing bus or ring 
structure is proposed. Those structures are available with data rates 
of 20 MBits/s (IEEE 802), thus leaving sufficient room for transmission 
of any additional information. A redundant construction of CCL2 will 
obviously be necessary. 
4.3.2. Reguirements for DML 
No detailed information is available yet on the algorithms performed in 
DML. Thus only the storage requirements for the data received from SEL 
can be estimated. 
a.) Short-term store 
The short-term storage should be able to keep the data mentioned in 
4.3.1.a for the past hour. During one hour these data amount to 
approximately 8 MBytes. Mierecomputer systems with an address space 
of 16 MBytes are available, but if time constraints are not too 
strong, a solution using a virtual memory organisation should be 
chosen. 
b.) Long-term store 
Long-term store contains the following data: 
- mean, maximum and minimum values of deviations, 2 Bytes each, 
resulting in 6*1.2 KBytes per hour, 
- classified deviations evaluated by SEL. If one change per hour 
is assumed one vector of 1.2 Kbytes is being generated per hour. 
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Under these assumptions the following data amounts are being produced 
approximately: 
8.5 KBytes per hour, 
200 KBytes per day, 
1.4 MByte? per week, 
6 MBytes per month, 
72 MBytes per year. 
Long-term storage should contain the history of the past year, this 
is possible by use of a winchester disk device, thus the data being 
available within some 50 ms. The actual data for one day or one week, 
if desired, can be kept in main memory for faster access. 
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Input Instr. AN NF TM DN/CM FT I TM/FI TN 
i1 10*2 11 K/s 
i3 1 *3 1 * 3 1*3/s 1*3/s 1*3/s 
0.01s 
i4 2*3 2*1/s 1*1/s 1*1/s 1*1/s 
i5 2*3 2*1/s 2 * 3 1*1/s 1*1/s 
0.33s 14 K/s I 
I 
i6 370*3 370*1 370*3 370*1 370*1 -




ill 30*1 30*1/s 
Instrumentation n*r n number of measuring points 
r redundancy 
Data output n*r/t 1/t sampling rate 
Table 4. 1. Data required by SEL units 
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neutron flux ~(t) 
RSl C Sn reference s i gna 1 s 
s~ (t) outlet temperature 
(Sn(t)-f .. (Ssc(t)-Ti (t))-Ti )G11 (outlet temperature is 
reference signal) 
s~ ( t) = 
(neutron flux is 
reference signal) 
Fig. 4.1. Analog preprocessing for TM/FI 
-49-
j ~=c---- Analog Data Processing----------<•"'+1 
I ,...-.·-
TA 1 
~ ~ ...... t= 1-r--" r 
I 
I Amplifier Mean Yalue I 
I Filter Separation 
I 
I r,.., I 
el Element Fu 












TA; fuel element outlet temperatures 
Tl$ core inlet temperature 
oi(t) temperature fluctuation signal 
4Tt temperature rise 
6t RMS va 1 ues of Ö;, 









CU..._ --- ::J I U:::t: 
I 

















ADC I I 









-------------------- :~:~:~: ___________ _ l
i5T 
i 10 1 
ADC I 
I ----"-:-i -=-1-=-1 r 
RIL 
CCL1 
Bus A Bus D ' '~B~u~s-E~------~L--
CCL 1 
SEL 
i 1 ' 
i 1" 
j 3 I; i4 
i5', i6 1 i 3 1 i4' 
5'= mean inlet temp. 
6 1 = mean outlet temp. 
6"= temperature ri se 
j 3 I, j 5 I 
i6 1 , i6" 
I I I I I I I I I 
j 3 I, i4 1 





I AN I I N F I I TM/ F I I I TN I I TM I I DN/CM I I FT I 
~~~---: ____ l ____ : _______ : ____ j ____ : _________ : ____ j ____ : _______ : ____ j ____ : ____________ : ____ I ____ : ____ : ____ J----: ___ : ____ 1----:c~~; 
I I 
I COMMON COMMUNICATION MEDIUM I 
I I 
cc~ l 1 cc~ 
0~~----------------------------- --------------~-------------------0~~-i-~~~--------------------------------------------------Ö~l 
I I : I I 
I Dec i s i on Maki ng I Reco rd i ng I 
I I : I I 
I _____ I : I I 






4.4.1 Software within the subsystem 11 Subassembly state and performance 
Monitoring 11 
M. Edelmann, Kfk-INR 
Corresponding to the major functions of KASUMOS described in paragraph 2.1 
three software modules exist for subassembly state and performance monitoring: 
Parameter estimation module 
SA simulator module 
Monitor and diagnosis module. 
Thesemodules can handle up to 32 signal channels in the present configuration 
of KASUMOS. This is sufficient to monitor the performance of all of the KNK II 
subassemblies on-line. However, the core of a breeder reactor consists of some 
500 fuel elements. Therefore, the sequential signal processing used in KASUMOS 
has tobe replaced by parallel processing procedures in an integrated LMFBR 
core surveillance system. Furthermore, the existing software is partly depen-
ding on the present hardware configuration and data structure produced by an 
additional data aquisition module in KASUMOS. Thus, most of this subsystem 
software has to be newly written. 
The parameter estimation module has to cover the following functions 
auto and cross power spectral density calculation (FFTF) of neutron and 
outlet temperature signals 
signal correlation 
calculation of SA transfer function from power spectral densities 
least-squares parameter fit of SA model transfer functions to measured 
ones (frequency domain) 
transient signal recording 
signal averaging 
least squares model parameter fit with transient signals (time domain) 
and correlation functions. 
The functions to be performed by the simulator and monitor modules are 
schematically described by Fig. 4.4.1-1. The SA simulator consists of 
a second-order digital low-pass filter. The signal surveyor compares 
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original and balanced SA outlet temperatures with individual thresholds 
and monitors statistical signal parameters. In case of specified anoma-
lies recording of all or of suspicious signals is triggered. 
The overall SA state and performancemonitaring procedure realized in 
KASUMOS is represented by the flow chart shown in Fig. 4.4.1-2. Its basic 
structure is still valid but some modifications and extensionswill be 
necessary to include recent experience and to adapt the existing software 
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Fig. 4.4.1-2 Flow chart of KASUMOS SA state and performance monitaring 
-54-
4.4.2 Software within the subsystem 
"Individual subassembly temperature monitoring" 
U. Voges, KfK/IDT 
For the detection of local cooling disturbances the individual 
subassembly temperatures are monitored. Forthis the following five 
algorithms are proposed. They are implemented in the MIRA system at 
KNK II and some of them will be realised in the LOKUS system at 
SNR300. 
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The following definitions are used in the description of the 
algorithms: 
T(i) individual coolant temperature of fuel element i 
High(i) individual upper temperature limit for fuel element 
T(in) coolant temperature at core inlet 
~T(i) = T(i)-T(in) 
MT(i) = 
1 
* r ~T(i) 
ng iEg 
mean group temperature of the group to which fuel 




number of fuel elements in group g 
K1, ... ,K8 tolerance limits 
p filtering constant, about 10 1 
q filtering constant, about 10 2 
N total number of fuel elements in core. 
f(i) individual correction factor 
1. Monitaring of the test zone 
if T(i) > High(i) 
then 11 urgent alarm 11 • 
This is a special algorithm for KNK II, where the 
center of the core contains certain test elements 
which have differing individual temperature limits. 




Comparison with group mean value 
if H(i) > f(i) * MT(i)+K1 
then 11 urgent alarm 11 
orif LiT(i) > f(i) * MT(i)+0.6 * K 1 
then 11 alarm 11 
orif LiT(i) < f(i) * MT(i)-K2 
then 11 message 11 
Several fuel elements are grouped together 
according to similar behaviour, e.g. similar 
reaction to control rod movements. 
3. Comparison with fixed upper and lower limits 
if T(i) > K3 
then 11 urgent alarm 11 
orif T( i) < K4 
then 11 message 11 
These comparisons can be considered as a fixed 
second line of defense or as plausibility check. 
Before they are activated other limit checking 
algorithms should produce alarms. 
4. Comparison with short-term mean value 
1 p-1 
* H( i) + 
p p 
if !IT(i) > AT/i,tn) + K5 
then 11 urgent alarm 11 
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orif LIT(i) > L\T (i,t) s n + o.s*K5 
then 11 alarm 11 
orif LIT(i) < LIT (i ,t ) - K s n 6 
then 11 message 11 
This algorithm shall detect fast developing disturbances 
(more than lOK/min) better than algorithm 2. 
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5. Comparison with long-term mean value 
1 q-1 
* LIT(i) + 
q q 





* l: LITL (i ,tn) 
i=l 
(long termglobal mean temperature) 
if LITL (i ,tn) > f(i) * LMT + K7 
then "urgent alarm 11 
orif LITL (i ,tn) > f(i) * LMT + 0.6 * K7 
then "alarm" 
orif LITL (i,tn) < f(i) * LMT- K8 
then 11 message 11 
This algorithm is suitable for rather slowly developing 
disturbances and temperature gradients (about lK/min). 
In a large LMFBR it might be necessary to have several 
long term group mean temperatures instead of one global 
in order to have a narrower bandwith, similar to al-
gorithm 2. 
Furtheranalysis and tests are necessary to decide on 
the optimal values for p,q, K1, ... ,K8 concerning 
availability and safety. To a certain extent they depend 
also on the reactor and its instrumentation. 
For the output of the produced information different means have to 
be used. On an alphanumeric VDU the following information should be shown: 
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- urgent alarms 
- alarms 
- messages. 
The general form of the information should be 
time fuel element position alarm/message text 
In addition different pictures and tables are wanted on a graphic 
colour VDU 
core picture with temperature range indicated by colour 
core picture with algorithm status indicated by colour 
table with current temperature 
table with current algorithm status. 
Besides this presentation of actual information some data logging is 
necessary, mainly identical to the output of the alphanumeric VDU. This 
information shall be available for later on-line look-up or off-line 
analysis. 
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4.4.3 Software within subsystem "Temperature Noise" 
G. WeinkBtz, L. Krebs 
Studies of the temperature fluctuations signals o(t) at the fuel subassembly 
outlet have shown that with defined conditions in signal analysis taken into 
account a bundel coefficient R can be deduced from the temperature fluctua-
tion signal. Independent of the respective power condition of the reactor, 
this coefficient essentially covers solely cooling disturbances within the 
fuel subassembly. 
Accordingly, the bundle coefficient k, here after termed k-value, is defined 
as follows: 
k-value 
RMS value of. o(t)* 
coolant temperature rise 6T 
For evaluating incipient cooling disturbances in the fuel subassembly the 
power spectral density (PSD) of the temperature fluctuation signal o(t) is 
of importance besides the k-value. 
On the RIL preprocess~ng level the reactor signal variables required, namely 
coolant inlet temperature 
fuel subassembly outlet temperature 
temperature fluctuation signal 




are generated in conformity with the requirements of digital processing. 
* Low pass filtered temperature fluctuation signal (low pass design dependent 
on the reactor operating data). 
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The Figure shows the functional sequence of Tempersture Noise (TN) measure-
ment of a fuel subassenbly to be monitored. For i-fuel subassemblies the 
signal sequences are repeated by the factor i. Digital process handling for 
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The coolant temperature rise 6T is formed by the coolant inlet temperature iS 
and the subassembly outlet temperature i6. 
T i6 - iS ( 1 ) 
To calculate the k-value the RMS value of o(t) generated in the TN pre-
processing system is taken over so that we obtain: 
k-value RMS value of o(t)* i6 - iS 
Executing Equation (2) the signal variables are scanned at 1 s-1• 
(2) 
The power spectral density (PSD) is calculated via the Fast Fourier Transfor-
mation (FFT) of the unfiltered temperature fluctuation signal 8 (t), the 
scanning frequency being 50 s- 1• 
The k-values K(i) and the characteristic functions PSD(i) are classified 
using reference variables R(i) and reference functions RF(i). The latter are 
determined during the startup phase of the reactor at the undisturbed (i) 
fuel subassemblies and stored into the reference memories Ref. k and Ref. PSD 
of the TN subsystem. To monitor the fuel subassemblies the K(i) values are 
continuously compared with the stored reference variables R(i) and evaluated 
on the basis of a specified bandwidth b. 
If the calculated K(i} actual values lie within a bandwidth specified for the 
R(i) reference values, a normalized signal vector = 1 is generated for a 
monitor c.isplay. 
We ob tai n: 
for 
Graph K(i) = 1 
R(i)-b < K(i) < R(i) + b 
(3) 
(4) 
The graph K(i) = 1 is mapped as a circle with i circular segments, where i is 
the nurober of the fuel subassernblies to be rnonitored. 
If a detected K(i) actual value lies outside the specified bandwidth, the 
respective fuel subassernbly position is displayed on the monitor and an alarm 
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signal is given. 
All K(i) actual values are additionally stored in a long-term memory. If a 
cooling disturbance in a fuel subassembly is diagnosed by the K(i) value, the 
subsequent development with time of the k-values determined for the respec-
tive fuel subassembly is traced by a plotter. Moreover, the k-values of the 
fuel subassembly in question which had been measured before the alarm, can be 
called from the long-term memory and used for the further diagnosis of the 
disturbance in cooling. 
Whereas classification of the parameters K(i) in the TN subsystem is done 
continuously, classification of the characteristic functions PSD(i) takes 
place only in case of indication of a cooling disturbance in a fuel sub-
assembly. If a cooling disturbance has been indicated, the power spectral 
density of the unfiltered temperature fluctuation signals 8(t) at the outlet 
of the respective fuel subassembly is calculated and evaluated in terms of 
frequency range and power amplitude using the stored reference function Ref. 
PSD(i). 
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4.4.4. Software within subsystem 'Acoustic Noise' 
H. Rohrbacher, KfK/IRE 
All analog signals coming from the acoustic instrumentation need to 
become preconditioned in order to meet the registration and S/N levels 
for signal recording and the following raw data input system level. 
This procedure is used for reducing and compressing data and it uses in 
parallel the following techniques: 
a) RMS formation by integration of all acoustic signals with an 
associated subsequent digitalization ( 8 bit accuracy) 
b) analog-ta-digital conversion and Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) with 
the aim to generate the autocorrelated power density spectra and the 
cross-correlation function for different channels of the acoustic 
surveillance system. 
c) determination of the coherence function with the object to get 
created input data for a pattern recognition system being part of the 
main processing level (DML). 
For the Acoustic Noise system AN all input data are affered in a 
digital format. The incoming data are analyzed and weighted by means 
of the procedures mentioned below: 
A. In the course of following transients in the RMS values from the 
RIL-level (a) all all events exceeding a predetermined trip margin will 
become stored in (a2). The assessment of the background RMS-information 
itself is performed in the AN RMS-trip system (al). It is based on a 
logarithmic weighting procedure following an internal digitizer 
implemented at the front end of (al). 
The trip signals yield a new RMS-information RMS' (a3). 
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In parallel, a counting rate subsystem (a4) enregisters the absolute 
frequency of the accumulated events. 
8oth, the frequency and the new RMS 1 information indicate the actual 
state for an internal classification (a5) of the acoustically measured 
system conditions in a first approach. The result from the RMS data 
evaluation is part of the input data for the main classificator ANMC 
on the AN-SEL level. 
8. The preconditioned and analog-tc-digital converted signals (a) from 
the RIL level are fed into the FFT subsystem with the aim to form the 
autocorrelated power density spectra PSD (b4) and by a next step, to 
calculate the coherence function (b3) and the cross-correlation 
function (b2) for a selected number of acoustic channels. 
From an associated data limiter (b5) it is defined the degree of the 
correlation, to say the coherence of the detected acoustic signals. 
This response serves to classify the result from the FFT preprocessing 
in AN on the SEL level by using a pre-classificator (b6) which is 
responsible for the FFT relevant procedures. The contents of the 
classificator is an input information destinated to the AN main 
classificator unit ANMC. 
C. The output from an A/D converter (b) and from the subsequent 
coherence function device generates a data set for the Pattern 
Recognition PRS-System which is not implemented in the AN-preprocessing 
unit but is a constituent of the DML. 
As the acoustic background of a reactor is always an individual varying 
within not too extended margins due to all thought operating conditions, 
the scope of the features to be considered from the background 
composition seems to be restricted. But it is suitable to start up with 
a learning process only under normal operating conditions with the 
determination to prove the criteria and to check the algorithms 
permanently with proceeding operation time. 
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The PRS is a fully computer aided digital system, thus it is 
appropriate and advisible to have it installed on the DML, that is, to 
incorporate it entirely on this level. 
D. In order to support the classification process on the ANMC level 
other redundant signals from the reactor instrumentation are needed. 
Since the AN is a digitally working device, only digital data coming 
from the RIL system may be accepted. There are the following four 
external signal groups: 
1. neutron flux (i3) 
2. coolant flow rate ( i 4) 
3. inlet temperature (i5) 
4. outlet temperature (i6) 
For the processing of neutron noise signals from RIL/i3 a cross-
correlator unit (c3) is implemented in the AN and its output going to 







flux information takes precedence of all other external 
practice it may happen that in the RMS channels no 
change or trip-valid fluctuation is indicated although 
present and becomes detected by only a few or single 
via the ADC-FFT path. As a consequence, this would be 
the cross-correlation section (c3) and is confirmed 
accordingly by the neutron noise signals without any noticeable time 
delay. 
The flow rate (i4) is linearly correlated to the pump speed in a wide 
domain. The mechanical rotation of the pumps is considered tobe an 
important information in the frame of the prominent acoustic noise 
sources in a reactor. Normally, the rpm values remain constant in the 
range of usual and possible reactor power levels. In that way the flow 
rate is an operating parameter for the RMS-analyzing system (al - a5). 
The relations between the flow rate signals and the contents of the 
calculated PSD (b4) are expressed much fewer and it was shown from 
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in-pile background measurements that the acoustic PSO spectra become 
linearly amplified while their power density distributionwas kept 
almest unchanged for a wide span of the pump speed. 
Restrietions are given for the upper domain of the nominal flow rate 
in case the pumps or parts of the relevant flow guiding systems start 
up to cavitate. This would result in a new and additional noise source 
with a very high frequency content and consequently, the onset of its 
appearance must be known in advance. 
Both the RMS chain and the FFT part are working with a 1 Hz repetition 
rate for the RMS integration and the PSD generation respectively. In 
that way, the main acoustic classificator in AN receives a new data set 
in steps of one second. The stated classified results are then 
presented to the succeeding communication medium CCL2 where it is 
evaluated tagether with the response from the PRS channel. 
For the AN, prov1s1ons are made for a terminal protocol which allows to 
monitor the actual data from the RMS channel on a display. Furthermore, 
it is requested to print out the the PSD spectra from the short-time 
and as well from the long-time computer memory. Additionally, the 
decision level of the DMC will be indicated optically andin parallel, 
this information is made available in a TTL-BCD format. 
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Functional Block-Diagram Acoustic Noise Measurement 
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4.4.5 Software in the "delayed neutron detection and cover 
gas monitoring" subsystem 
by 
S. Jacobi 
KfK - IRE 
4.4.5.1 Indication of a leaker 
Cladding tube defects generating only a cover gas signal and 
not causing a DN signal exceeding normal background are termed 
"gas leakers" or briefly "leakers." This denomination is 
justified by the fact that there is no contact between sodium 
and fuel so that no DN signal can be generated. In general, 
the defect consists in a flaw in welding at an end plug of a 
pin or in defects due to corrosion at the cladding tube itself. 
In both cases only fission product gas is blown off into the 
sodium through these small holes. 
Treatment of a leaker by the software in the "delayed neutron 
detection and cover gas monitoring" system has been represented 
in fig. 1, the related hardware configuration in fig. 2 [1, 2]. 
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Fig. 1: Indication of a leaker with information and instructions 
to the operator. 
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The development of a leaker is shown by way of example in 
fig. 3 and in table [2). With the power increasing in the 
BR2 reactor in Mol, Belgium, a strongly rising Kr-85m activity 
concentration was observed. Plots and measurement protocols 
of this type as well as further plant specific information 
are typical tools to assist the operator in continuing reactor 
operation with failed fuel elements. 
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EXPERIMENT MOL 7/C4 
Fi~. 3: Increasin~ Kr-85m activity concentration during 
reactor start 
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Table Measurement protocol of a fission product gas leaker; 
cf. fig. 3. 
COCOSS Vers. 1,0 Schutzsas-Messung Hol 7C/4 
HessF<rotokoll 
SPektrua Nr,: 309 Bandseraet defekt Platte: 15 I 25 
Start: 7. Dez, 1983 19l22l05 Ende: 19:55:43 
Lifet.ime = 2001, s Trueltll:!le = 2011.00 s 
Geometriefaktor = O.l32780E-05 KollimatorPOSllionl 
E1chfaktoren: A = -0.00000041 B = 1.00048578 C = 
H1tte1- Start-
Reaktorleistuns (111Jtl 29.08 29.08 
Delektor=aehlrate <Im~/s) 418. 56 427,60 
Prae~ip,-Zaehlrate <I~~/s) o.oo o.oo 
DHD-Ost (J .. p/s) o.oo o.oo 
ONO-West (Ifl>Pis) o.oo o.oo 
SchutzsasdrucV.. (bar) o.oo o.oo 
s c h 'J t z • a s d r u c k zu niedruh Se rechnet ut 
OeadtiBe = 0.5 Z 
1 Voluaen 64.28 cc• Detektorname: 
-0.76124573 ketne a•Jlomatlsche Eichun~ 
Ende- MaxiAtal- Minifilialwerte 
29.07 29.08 29,07 
448.90 451.60 395.80 
o.oo o.oo o.oo 
o.oo o.oo o.oo 
o.oo o.oo o.oo 




I Tabellenwerte I Messwerte I 
I========================================= I======================================================================== I 
I Nr. N•Jklid Hwz, Abund. Ener5!le I Er.erSle Senaue U-Grur,d Sisnal Kz, Hwb. Fehl, Akti.Konz, I 
I (%) (keV) I (~.eV) Kanall. (Im~) (ImP) <l<eV) (%) (1/s*Nccm) I 
I=========================================l========================================================================I 
I I Xe 133 5,65 d 36,6 80,99 I 79,32 80,0 9015, 3184, 3, 1.5 17,8 0,293Et02 I 
I 2 Kr 85to 4.40 h 74.0 150,99 I 149.52 150,2 132::!5. 14945. ..J• 2,5 5.7 0.707Et02 I 
l 3 ~r 88 2,80 h 37,0 196.!0 I 194,61 195,3 9703, 6646, 5, 2.5 10,5 0.920Et02 I 
I 4 Xe 133m 2.26 d 14.0 232.90 I I 
I-----------------------------------------1------------------------------------------------------------------------I 
I Xe 135 9,14 h 91.0 249,80 I 248.09 248,8 8957, 29867, 7, 2,5 3.0 0,267Et03 I 
I 6 Xe 138 14.! '' 31.0 250.30 I I 
I 7 Kr 87 76,0 m 53,0 402,80 I 400.69 401,3 2304, 939, 4, 2,5 32,6 0,395Et02 I 
I 8 Cs 138 32.2 m 27,8 462,80 I 460.97 461,6 2830, 1695. 5, 2,5 22,0 0.!70Et03 l 
I-----------------------------------------I------------------------------------------------------------------------1 
I 9 Kr 85 10,7 a 0,4 513,99 I I 
I 10 Xe 135m 15.6 ~ ao.o 526.80 
I II Xe 135 9.!4 h 2,4 608,60 
I 12 Kr 88 2.80 h 13,0 834,70 I 832,59 833,2 751, 444, 5, 2,5 43,9 0,260Et03 I 
I-----------------------------------------I------------------------------------------------------------------------1 
I 13 Rb 89 15.! a 60,0 1030,70 I I 
I 14 Ar 41 !,84 h 99,0 1293,64 I 1291,25 1292.! 410. 3993, 9, 3,5 6,4 0,749Et03 I 
I 15 Cs 138 32,2 m 75,0 1435,90 I 1433.37 1434.3 252, 955, 7, 2,5 16,0 0,306Et03 I 
I 16 Kr 89 191, s 9,5 1472,10 I I 
l------------------------------------~----1------------------------------------------------------------------------I 
I 17 Kr 88 2,80 h 11.3 1529,80 I I 
I 18 Xe 138 14,1 • 17,7 1768.20 I I 
I 19 Rb 88 17.8 m 30.2 1836,13 I !833.44 1834,7 147, 288, 6, 2,5 35,1 0.390Et03 I 
I 20 X<> 138 14.1 m 12.5 2015,80 l 2027,15 2028,6 30, 96, 4, 1,5 53.! 0,376Et03 I 
!==================================================================================================================! 
I I 73.21 73.9 24736, 10094. 8, 2.5 12.5 
I 2 83.!4 83.9 16738. 2148, 5, 1.5 39,7 
I 3 164,22 164.9 6861, 1136, 3, 1,5 41,0 
I 4 l 303,23 303,9 3715, 1052, 5, 1,5 39,9 I 
1-----------------------------------------I------------------------------------------------------------------------I 
I 5 I 508,87 509.5 2538, 1298, 8, 3,5 32.2 I 
I 6 I 545,04 545,7 1368, 581. vo 2,5 43,7 I 
I 7 I 659,66 660,3 1782, 7263, 7, 2.5 5,7 I 
I B 895,93 896,6 635. 477, 4, 2,5 36.2 I 
I 9 1007,42 1008.! 907. 681, 5, !,5 32,6 I 
I 10 I 1367,71 1368.6 180, 212, 4, 2,5 43.9 I 
I========================================·=========================================================================l 
Ur~ache fuer Proto~olla11s9 1 
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4.4.5.2 DN failure 
Treatment of a DN failure is much more complicated than treat-
ment of a leaker. The reason are the possible consequences 
on reactor operation- as described in chapter 2.5 - and the 
authorization of the DN signal to shut down the reactor auto-
matically. Figure 4 is a block diagram showing the treatment 
of a DN failure by the example of KNK II [1]. 
Fig. 4: Treatment of a DN failure with information and instruc-
tions to the operator, shown by the examnle of KNK II. 
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As other subsystems are not affected by the DN signals and 
the cover gas signals, these signals are not preprocessed on 
the RIL plane. The measured DN signals are evaluated in the 
"delayed neutron detection and cover gas monitoring" subsystem 
according to the algorithms described below [3]. 
For radioactive fission products released as result of recoil 
mechanisms it is assurned that fission products formed in a 
layer of the thickness L. right underneath the defect area F 
1. 
are spontaneously released into the coolant by recoil as a 
fraction ö. After an equilibrium condition has become established, 
the following equation holds: 
R.R = Ö • F . L. 
1. 1. 
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neutron activity concentration 
of nuclide i in sodium at 
time t 1 
fraction of decays with 
neutron emission 
sodium flow rate 
transit time of sodium from 
defect area to DND monitor 
( 3) 
count rate caused by nuclide i 
sodium density 
neutron sensitivity of the 
DN monitor 
sodium volume in front of the 
DN monitor 
With these three equations (1), (2), and (3) and assQming a 
mean specific fission rate S, the DN signal 
is used to calculate the defect area which is effective according 
to the recoil model. Following signal stabilization a k-factor 
can be put in depending on the fission material inventory of the 
fuel rod and the size of the defect area F; cf. chapter 2.5. In 
the following 11 local flux tilting 11 campaign the position of the 
failed fuel element is determined for different configurations 
of absorber rod positions. The necessary criteria of selection 
are known to the specialists but, because they are highly 
complex, the respective algorithms are still in the phase of 
deve lopmen t. 
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[1] G. Hoffmann, S. Jacobi, G. Schmitz: 
Transfer of expert knowledge to the consulting core 
surveillance system COCOSS at KNK II. 
In Proc. Fifth Power Plant Dynamics, Control and 
Testing Symposium, March 21-23, 1983, Knoxville, 
Tenn., USA. 
[2] G. Hoffmann, KfK-IRE, personal communication, August 84. 
[3] G. Hoffmann, S. Jacobi, G. Schmitz, M. Relic: 
Fuel failure detection and location in fast breeder 
reactors. 
In: S. Jacobi, editor: Fuel failure detection and 
location in LMFBRs. Proc. of Int. Atomic Energy Agency 
Specialists' Meeting, Karlsruhe, May 11-14, 1981, 
KfK 3203, June 1982. 
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4.4.6 Software within decision making level (DML) 
K. Schleisiek, KfK/IRE 
The principles and functions of the DML have been described in detail in 
Sect. 3. The structure of the system is shown in Fig. which represents 
only the most important elements of the decision making process. Detailed 
programs and software have not yet been elaborated. So', only some general 
remarks will be made in this section. 
The first subsystem of the DML concerns the preprocessing of data trans-
mitted from the SEL. It is assumed that the data are edited from SEL in 
suitable format and levels. Hence, the main task of this subsystem is 
the distribution of informations to the following subsystems and the 
storage devices. In detail these are: 
Sequences of measured signals to the event analysis subsystem upon system 
or operator request, 
valuated signals to the short-term storage with a rate of 1 
-1 
s 
determination of maximum, minimum and average of the valuated signals 
and transfer to the long-term storage at time intervals of one hour, 
check of classified deviatio::1s for changes and initiation of event 
analysis proces s. 
The next subsystem ~s the event analysis procedure which is performed in the 
time and frequency domain. At the beginning of the analysis the relevant 
detection systems and signal channels have to be selected. This will be clone 
on the basis of the stored list of events and the related detection possi-
bili ties. Each channel will then be checked for undetected deviation taking 
into account the response time of the related detection system. The corres-
ponding sequences of data have to be called up from the short-term storage. 
The search procedure could consist in the analysis of density and amplitude 
of peaks in the signal compared "normal" phases. For some detection system 
an analysis in the frequency domain is suitable. The relevant data must 
have a common time base and partially a band width larger than the data 
stored. Therefore ~n cases when a frequency analysis is requested, sequen-
ces of signals as actually measured are transmitted to the event analysis 
subsystem. The software necessary for this taks is generally available: 
these are the methods usually used for the analysis of stochastic signals 
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like PSD, CPSD, RMS; etc. The criteria for the recognition of abnormalies 
are still to be evaluated. Partially this can only be done on the basis of 
the experience gained in the initial training phase of the system. 
For the final identification of events again the stored iist of events 
and related detection possibilities is used. In the ge~eral case definite 
attribution of a distinct event to one detected deviation is not possible. 
But as explained 1n Sect. 3 the possibility of diverse detection by corre-
lating signals from different systems provides more information on the 
actual event and support its identification. 
The identified events are stored in the disturbances analysis subsystem. 
Besides, this system contains the cause-consequence-diagrams (or event 
trees) of possible disturbances established in advance or on the basis of 
experience. 
If one or more events have been detected then the stored diagrams are 
checked for the observed event or event sequence. The required algorithms 
are simple and need no further description. It is evident that the detec-
tion of only one event is normally not sufficient for the definite identi-
fication of the actual disturbance. But with the progression of the 
fault the nurober of identified events will increase and consequently also 
the chance of correct identification. 
For the pattern recognition method the classified deviations stored in the 
long-term storagewill be used. The principles of pattern recognition are 
well known and need no further explication. In this particular application 
one of the main difficul ties of pattern recogni tion is not existing: the 
classified deviations can be used as pattern and no special procedure for 
pattern extraction is necessary. Synthetic or previously observed sets of 
results are used for training of the system. Each disturbance corresponds 
to a class of results of the pattern recognition process. During qperation 
the actual set of data is compared wi th the pattern of the stored distur-
bances using the usual procedures e.~. the nearest neighbour method. By 
this way it 1s determined which of the stored disturbances has the highest 
probability to be identical with the observed one. 
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5. Implementation plan 
Due to the complexity of the proposed concept it is necessary to plan 
a stepwise realization. This realization can to some degree use the 
know-how from the existing core surveillance systems. 






Realization of a vertical subsystem which consists of 
- preprocessing (RIL) 
- data exchange (CCL1) 
- individual processing (SEL) 
and interfacing to the decision-making-level (DML). 
Implementation of the DML-algorithms. 
This implementation uses simulated input data and produces 
messages, warnings and protocols. The detailed layout and 
optimal presentation is fixed in a later stage (in the 
realization of the OGL). 
Relization of all seperate subsystems according to step 1. 
Construction of the output generation level (OGL) and 
integration of the compete system. 
Instead of this sequential plan, some of these steps can be executed 
in parallel. Depending on the available man-power and other resources 
step 1 and step 2 are candidates for parallel implementation. 
The same holds for step 3 and step 4. 
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6. Conclusions 
The KfK-part of the study consists of three main topics: 
The first topic deals with the existing core surveillance techniques. 
Operational experience with this seperate system is reported on. 
The second topic handles the integration aspect. Main emphasis is 
given to the development of algorithms for combination and correlation 
of results of individual systems. The prerequisite for this task of 
algorithm development is a very good knowledge of the physcial 
process. This algorithm is to some degree comparable with the 
development of a 'knowledge base I known from the artificial 
intelligence discipline. 
The third topic, entitled systems analysis, is concerned with the 
refinement of the hardware- and software-requirements for the proposed 
system concept. 
Based on these results subsequent development work should concentrate 
on following main aspects: 
According to the refined concept of the integrated system a 
prototype-subsystem should be realized, which is limited to one 
surveillance technique (e.g. the monitaring of individual fuel 
elements). This implementation requires the fixing of the interface 
between the seperate evaluation level (SEL) and the 
decision-making-level (DML). 
The most important and difficult work concerns the implementation 
of the DML-algorithms tagether with the associated data structures. 
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III. Summary 
This joint KfK- and INTERATOM-study shows the potential of modern 
information technology in the area of LMFBR control. 
In the first part a distributed system for process control is 
suggested. One aspect of this system is the built-in redundancy and 
diversity. This leads to a graceful degradable system even in cases of 
single failed subsystems. 
Another important topic is the usage of artificial intelligence 
techniques, especially pattern recognition techniques. 
In the second part a new attempt is made for the construction of an 
expert system for LMFBR-control. 
One of the difficult tasks is the construction of a high quality 
knowledge base. Unfortunately characteristic information available in 
expert systems is of imprecise and hardly quantifyable nature. That is 
the reason for consideration of the 'fuzzy-set' approach. 
To summarize the state of the art, we can say that sophistication of 
methods, especially in the area of pattern recognition , has reached a 
stage of ripe, which makes this technique a serious candidate for the 
usage in modern computer-based control systems. 
